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ESSAY
CRIMINAL LEGAL EDUCATION
Shaun Ossei-Owusu*
ABSTRACT
The protests of 2020 have jumpstarted conversations about criminal justice
reform in the public and professoriate. Although there have been longstanding
demands for reformation and reimagining of the criminal justice system, recent
calls have taken on a new urgency. Greater public awareness of racial bias,
increasing visual evidence of state-sanctioned killings, and the televised policing
of peaceful dissent have forced the public to reckon with a penal state whose brutality was comfortably tolerated. Scholars are publishing op-eds, policy proposals, and articles with rapidity, pointing to different factors and actors that
produce the need for reform. However, one input has gone relatively unconsidered: legal education.
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Faculty who teach criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence—what I
describe as criminal legal education—are unassuming but integral players in the
American system of punishment. They are responsible for the early legal training
of prosecutors and public defenders. Surprisingly, the relationship between these
lawyers’ education and criminal justice outcomes is underexplored. This Essay
provokes a different kind of conversation by arguing that criminal legal education
has some responsibility for our penal status quo. To fortify this argument, this
Essay draws on scholarship on legal education and the legal profession. This
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literature illustrates how law schools socialize students into reproducing hierarchy
and inequality. However, these insights are rarely applied to the criminal justice
system and instead focus on the private sector. Longstanding and recent critiques
of law school’s inattention to race, poverty, and gender reinforce this Essay’s argument about criminal legal education’s inequality-producing character. Ultimately,
this Essay contends that attention to the oversights in the criminal justice curriculum provides an immediate, potentially fruitful, but rarely considered criminal justice reform strategy.
INTRODUCTION
The American criminal justice system is in a season of public reckoning. A
summer of protests—organized around anti-Black police violence—has shifted the
views of a mainstream public that often ignored, disbelieved, or shrugged off advocates who argued that the criminal justice system is irredeemably biased.1 Legal
academics responded immediately. Law school deans, centers, and professors
issued statements and penned op-eds decidedly denouncing white supremacy and
police brutality.2 These messages have important expressive functions and communicate values to the legal community and the broader population. Police are often the authors of state-sanctioned violence, so the focus on them was and
continues to be appropriate. But legal academics’ focus on police, along with a
larger failure of introspection, obscures law schools’ role in criminal justice inequality. This Essay provides a controversial corrective. I argue that law schools
are key sites for the reproduction of our penal status quo, yet are relatively ignored
in criminal justice scholarship. Legal education perpetuates some of the excesses
of our criminal justice system.
Although the protests of summer 2020 generated new kinds of reflections on the
criminal justice system, it is unclear that it will prompt changes in the criminal justice curriculum. This seems particularly true for first-year criminal law, as well as
for bar courses such as criminal procedure and evidence—all three of which I
describe as “criminal legal education.” Despite the very audible, social justiceinspired calls for criminal justice reform, the legal education of future prosecutors
and public defenders is likely to remain constant. In fact, scholars have drawn
attention to the race, class, and gender insensitivities of criminal justice teaching

1. Nate Cohn & Kevin Quealy, How Public Opinion Has Moved on Black Lives Matter, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/10/upshot/black-lives-matter-attitudes.html.
2. See, e.g., Press Release, Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Hum. Rts. Clinic, Statement on the Extrajudicial
Killings of Black People in the United States (June 9, 2020), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/allard-klowenstein-international-human-rights-clinic-statement-extrajudicial-killings-black-people; Press Release, Univ.
of Tex., Statement of the Deans of the Ten Texas Law Schools Condemning Racism and Remembering George
Floyd (June 10, 2020), https://law.utexas.edu/news/2020/06/10/statement-of-the-deans-of-the-ten-texas-lawschools/.
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for decades.3 Although the nature of the criticisms has changed, the core critiques
are still relevant today.
Accordingly, this Essay contends that criminal legal education plays a role in
our penal status quo by way of its poor treatment of issues tied to race, gender, and
poverty.
This argument builds on longstanding as well as recent critiques of legal education. Almost four decades ago, Duncan Kennedy argued that law schools reproduce hierarchy and social inequality.4 Assuming this is right—and available
empirical accounts of legal education seem to suggest so5—this would mean that
the core criminal justice courses taught in law school are not immune from this critique. The reproduction critique has been generally applied to the private sector
but has compelling relevance to the training of future lawyers. This Essay draws
the connection. More recently, Alice Ristroph’s deep dives into the history of substantive criminal law—the only of their kind—put forth the closest and strongest
message that this Essay builds upon: “American law schools, through the required
course on substantive criminal law, have contributed affirmatively to the collection
of phenomena commonly labeled mass incarceration.”6 Professor Ristroph’s
assessment is correct and is just one part of a larger narrative about legal education’s reluctance to take full account of its role in our criminal justice crisis. This
Essay picks up the baton and widens the discussion beyond substantive criminal

3. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE & JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 56 (1997) (describing students’ concern about the trivialization of women as
victims of rape in criminal law); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 80–97 (1991)
(discussing the inappropriate ways race, class, and gender are treated and ignored in criminal law classes and
exams); Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 368–
70 (2015) (describing the ahistorical treatment of issues such as slavery and Jim Crow in legal education and
inviting these kinds of discussions in criminal law); M.K.B. Darmer, Teaching Whren to White Kids, 15 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 109, 128–32 (2009) (critiquing pedagogical approaches to race in criminal procedure); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Mainstreaming Feminism in Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 199, 206–08 (2003) (discussing
the need for more robust discussions about gender in criminal law courses); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw,
Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 7–9 (1988)
(describing law students’ objections to how one criminal law instructor engaged issues of race in a criminal law
course and making suggestions about how conversations about race could be better handled in the provocation
section of a criminal law class).
4. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 591–
92 (1982).
5. See, e.g., ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER”
205–06 (2007); GUINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 27; WENDY LEO MOORE, REPRODUCING RACISM: WHITE SPACE,
ELITE LAW SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL INEQUALITY 9–12 (2008).
6. Alice Ristroph, The Curriculum of the Carceral State, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (2020)
[hereinafter Ristroph, Curriculum]; Alice Ristroph, An Intellectual History of Mass Incarceration, 60 B.C.
L. REV. 1949, 1950, 2008 (2019) [hereinafter Ristroph, Intellectual History]; see also #DefundthePolice
Solidarity, A Time for Solidarity: An Open Letter to Our Colleagues, MEDIUM (Aug. 24, 2020), https://
medium.com/@solidarityinthemoment/a-time-for-solidarity-8a1ce0e52210 (calling law professors and
scholars of punishment to account for their role in mass incarceration and address anti-Black racism and
white supremacy in the legal system).
AND
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law to illustrate how the engagement with race, poverty, and gender in criminal
legal education contributes to the reproduction of our penal status quo.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I particularizes the long-standing critique
that legal education is not designed to challenge the status quo.7 Part II draws on
the literature about law school socialization to underline the reproduction critique.
The Essay concludes by tying the importance of curricular reform to the current
shape of the criminal justice bureaucracy.
I. CRIMINAL LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY
Social scientists have spent decades writing about how schools and educational
systems reproduce the social order.8 The nature of this reproduction is multidimensional and spans the educational gamut. Young boys and girls learn about
gender divisions and sex identity through seemingly mundane activities such as
restroom use, teasing, and play.9 Racial lessons are conveyed through curricular
choices as well as practices of punishment.10 From elementary to high school, residential segregation produces a range of inequalities that ultimately shape who
goes to college and where they choose to enroll.11 From the Ivy Leagues to the
politically-embattled for-profit colleges, higher education—the presumed bastion
of social mobility—is freighted by a high-wire act of accommodating accumulated
advantage and entrenched inequalities.12 Schools of all levels supply their students
with knowledge—some basic and some technical. But educational systems also

7. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 598; see also Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski
& K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century
Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1789–90 (2020).
8. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND
CULTURE 177–78 (Richard Nice trans., 2d ed. 1990) (noting that the societal hierarchy exists in schools); PIERRE
BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 1 (Richard Nice trans., 1984)
(explaining the influence of social origin in the educational system); see generally MICHAEL W. APPLE,
IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM (4th ed. 2019) (addressing the relationship between cultural and economic power in
education); MICHAEL W. APPLE, EDUCATION AND POWER (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the reproduction of and
resistance to unequal power relations in educational institutions).
9. See BARRIE THORNE, GENDER PLAY: GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL 49–53 (1993).
10. See AMANDA E. LEWIS, RACE IN THE SCHOOLYARD: NEGOTIATING THE COLOR LINE IN CLASSROOMS AND
COMMUNITIES 18 (2003).
11. See, e.g., ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE 1–13 (2d ed. 2011)
(discussing the focus of middle-class parents on “concerted cultivation” in comparison to working-class parents’
focus on “the accomplishment of natural growth”); see generally MEGAN M. HOLLAND, DIVERGENT PATHS TO
COLLEGE: RACE, CLASS, AND INEQUALITY IN HIGH SCHOOLS (2019) (explaining how race and class determine the
pathways for high school students post-graduation); ANN L. MULLEN, DEGREES OF INEQUALITY: CULTURE,
CLASS, AND GENDER IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2012) (addressing class disparities in the college
experience).
12. See, e.g., JENNIFER MORTON, MOVING UP WITHOUT LOSING YOUR WAY: THE ETHICAL COSTS OF UPWARD
MOBILITY 37–39 (2019) (discussing the hurdles disadvantaged college students face in seeking upward
mobility); see generally ANTHONY ABRAHAM JACK, THE PRIVILEGED POOR: HOW ELITE COLLEGES ARE FAILING
DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS (2019) (examining what happens to disadvantaged students when they attend elite
colleges).
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inculcate their students with middle-class value systems in preparation for an economically and socially-stratified society.
Legal education is not immunized from reproduction analyses. Duncan
Kennedy lodged a scathing critique almost forty years ago that scholarship on the
legal profession has had to contend with since.13 For the uninitiated, unfamiliar, or
misremembered, the gist of Kennedy’s argument is this: the seminal first-year
courses of law schools are indoctrination factories that teach students the mystified
skill of legal reasoning but do so in ways that are detached from actual lawyering
as well as pressing policy problems.14 In doing so, law schools endow students
with a set of political attitudes that naturalize inequality and prepare students to be
foot soldiers in the legal order—primarily in private sector law firms, but also in
the other spheres of the legal profession.15 Since Kennedy’s critique, scholars have
offered slightly more nuanced and less polemical takes on legal education.16 Still,
the basic premise about law school’s inequality-producing features remains.
Investigations into law schools’ reproductive qualities have also brought more
granular approaches to race and gender. Lani Guinier and her colleagues describe
how the male-oriented nature of legal education denigrates women and can have
career-defining effects by influencing their academic performance, ultimately
determining things like who gets on law review, secures clerkships, and graduates
at the top of the class.17 Wendy Leo Moore’s ethnographic study of law schools,
unambiguously titled Reproducing Racism, details how legal education reproduces
ideas of white superiority by focusing on racially subtle messages that emerge
from the plastering of white alumni across law school buildings, as well as the
more obvious sites such as classroom discussions and pedagogy.18 Class bias also
lurks in the background of legal education. A handful of scholars highlight how
most law schools draw their faculty from the same small pool of elite law schools,
which leads to a socio-economically homogenous professoriate that is insensitive
to social stratification in its teaching.19 These texts, related scholarly literature, and
13. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 591–92.
14. Id. at 597–98.
15. Id.
16. For one particularly thoughtful take, see Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How
Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155 (2008).
17. See GUINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 28–29; see also Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal
Education Is Failing Women, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 389, 403 (2006) (discussing how men “dominate class
discussions” and “use their classroom experiences as a springboard for building academically and professionally
rewarding relationships with faculty members” while noting that “[d]iminished or less effective classroom
participation by women feeds into diminished or less effective out-of-class interactions between faculty members
and female students”).
18. MOORE, supra note 5, at 23–24.
19. See Jewel, supra note 16, at 1197 (“The American legal profession has long been viewed as occupying the
cultural and social space of the aristocracy.”); Eric J. Segall & Adam Feldman, The Elite Teaching the Elite: Who
Gets Hired by the Top Law Schools?, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 614, 618 (2019) (finding that eighty percent of the
faculty in the top twenty-five law schools went to a top ten law school); Eli Wald, Serfdom Without Overlords:
Lawyers and the Fight Against Class Inequality, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 269, 297–98 (2016) (discussing how
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a cottage industry of autobiographical takes on legal education lead to one conclusion: law schools have unclean hands when it comes to the production of social
inequality.20
Yet much of the relevant legal scholarship on the reproduction of hierarchy
focuses on legal practice more generally or is specific to the private sector, but is
rarely applied to criminal practice (i.e., prosecution and criminal defense). Since
private sector law constitutes the lion’s share of work into which graduates go, this
particularized focus makes sense. But this raises the question: what does the reproduction of hierarchy look like in the world of criminal justice? Available literature
allows us to make some reasonable inferences. Put simply, a wide range of scholarship suggests that legal education contributes to our penal status quo through its
poor handling of race, poverty, and gender issues in the criminal justice curriculum. This poor handling occurs through omission, lack of attention, and in some
instances, outright fumbling.
Evidence law is arguably the least scrutinized of the three core criminal justice
courses when it comes to questions of pedagogy. Still, there have been longstanding critiques around its treatment of gender.21 The existence of rape shield laws

law schools “exclusively retain faculty from privileged backgrounds”); Michael J. Higdon, A Place in the
Academy: Law Faculty Hiring and Socioeconomic Bias, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 171, 175 (2013) (noting that
“students who attend top-tier law schools are overwhelmingly representative of the elite socioeconomic class”
and arguing that “hiring faculty members from primarily those ranks undermines a law school’s ability to
achieve socioeconomic diversity on its faculty and instead helps perpetuate a class-based monopoly within the
legal academy to the detriment of all involved”); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Confess’n the Blues: Some Thoughts on
Class Bias in Law School Hiring, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 119, 119–20 (1992) (suggesting that “people with workingclass backgrounds” are not found in legal academia and describing the class bias in the legal professoriate); see
also Milan Markovic, The Law Professor Pipeline, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 813, 817 (2020) (describing how new law
professors largely received their undergraduate education from the most elite private colleges that serve the
wealthiest segments of society).
20. See, e.g., ALFREDO MIRANDÉ, THE STANFORD LAW CHRONICLES: DOIN’ TIME ON THE FARM 4 (2005)
(describing the “values and ethos” of law school as those of “elite white male culture”); see generally KATHRYNE
M. YOUNG, HOW TO BE SORT OF HAPPY IN LAW SCHOOL (2018) (noting that social inequality in law schools is
systemic); ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (1992)
(asking why law students identifying as liberal to leftist choose corporate law practice over public interest work);
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1999) (same); ROBERT
V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL
(1989) (same).
21. See Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where
You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221, 222 (1999); Aviva Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A Feminist
Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 159, 162–63 (1997);
Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 1032, 1035–36 (1996); Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist
Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 127, 127 (1996); Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute,
and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 914, 916–17 (1994); Susan Stefan, The
Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1277
(1994); Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision
of Truth, 37 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 125 (1992); Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
413, 413–14 (1991); Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for
the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 776–77 (1986).

2021]

CRIMINAL LEGAL EDUCATION

419

and marital privilege, along with issues tied to domestic violence and rape trauma,
has made it so that at a bare minimum, gender surfaces in evidence courses.22 But
assumptions remain. Catharine MacKinnon’s argument that gender should be
mainstreamed and brought to the fore of evidence courses captures some of the elisions that evidence students and future criminal justice lawyers may miss.
MacKinnon objects to the flattening of social categories like gender. How much
does evidence law “ignore how inequality constructs reliability,” she questions.23
She also asks how much evidence law assumes “a uniformity of experience” that
conditions of inequality actually refute.24
Shining light on more omissions and conflations that likely filter into teaching,
evidence scholars have picked up the baton and discussed the lack of attention to
race. As Jasmine Gonzales Rose explains, “Most judges, lawyers, and scholars
appear to assume that since evidence law is facially race-neutral, it applies equally
to all persons irrespective of race.”25 Of particular concern here are the ways race
filters through ideas about character evidence26 and evidentiary credibility.27 Also
relevant are the intersectional oversights of an adoptive admission rule that ignores
the role silence plays in non-white communities;28 the uncritical use of prior convictions notwithstanding a demonstrably biased and flawed criminal justice system;29 and the variety of ways race creeps into evidentiary considerations.30 The
inattention to race and gender in evidence law can lead to the reasonable

22. See Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the
Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 998 (2006).
23. MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 209–10.
24. Id.
25. Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Racial Character Evidence in Police Killing Cases, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 369,
375 (2018).
26. See id. at 389–91; see also Chris Chambers Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting the
Racial Character of Rule 404(b) Evidence, 25 LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing how racial references are
either admitted or excluded as character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 402).
27. See Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward A Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2243,
2259–60 (2017).
28. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Adoptive Admissions and the Meaning of Silence: Continuing the Inquiry into
Evidence Law and Issues of Race, Class, Gender, and Ethnicity, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 337, 338–39 (1999) (arguing
that the adoptive admission rule, which suggests that a listener will refute it, ignores how race, class, gender, and
ethnicity influences silence and equivocation); see also Mikah K. Story Thompson, Methinks the Lady Doth
Protest Too Little: Reassessing the Probative Value of Silence, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. Rev. 21, 21–22, 40 (2008)
(suggesting that Black and Hispanic individuals, who are more likely to be distrustful of law enforcement, may
choose to remain silent).
29. See Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the Prior
Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 521–22 (2009) (contending that the use of prior convictions in
evidence law is inherently unreliable due to the massive evidence of racial bias in the criminal justice system,
ultimately imposing a tax on Black defendants, and arguing that prior convictions fit into the category of
hearsay).
30. See Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867, 867–68 (2018) (describing
how issues like dress, demeanor, and race go underregulated by the Rules of Evidence, are unchecked by
evidentiary gatekeepers, and are ultimately used by fact-finders in their determinations of guilt).
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conclusion that future criminal lawyers are leaving law school with incomplete
understandings of how some fundamental evidentiary concepts can play out in
practice.
The reproduction of inequality also occurs through the omission of important
topics in classroom discussions and the casebooks that are the primary educational
tools for students. Scholars have highlighted this problem in criminal law and procedure. Feminist scholars identified the issues of sex bias in criminal law teaching
in the late 1980s and 1990s,31 and though gender operates differently in these
courses, teaching sexual assault and rape still remains a challenge. Some instructors refuse to teach in this area out of fear, discomfort, or disinterest. While some
of that reluctance is understandable, Jeannie Suk Gersen’s observation is instructive: not teaching sexual assault remarginalizes a topic that was once considered
unimportant.32 Such non-teaching may unwittingly (or purposely) reproduce a status quo where sexual violence is not taken seriously.33
Other omissions abound. Frank Zimring similarly does not mince words and
contends that academic criminal law is irrelevant because of its failure to meaningfully address “the important policy discourses of the modern age.”34 The primary
policy issue he describes as “the sevenfold growth in the incarcerated population
that happened after 1972 . . . and the massive ‘war on drugs’ that exploded in the
United States between 1985 and 1995.”35 Alice Ristroph’s recent deep dives into
the history and development of criminal law casebooks are especially trenchant.36
Lamenting the “pro-carceral” messages in substantive criminal law casebooks,
Professor Ristroph catalogs the non-inclusion of gun and drug possession crimes
that contributed to mass incarceration.37 For Ristroph, the uncritical endorsement
of pro-carceral messages, in what is typically the only required first-year criminal
justice course, is responsible for producing a “law school to prison pipeline” that
entails lawyers who are partially responsible for mass incarceration.38
Criminal procedure—the field that has arguably been most shaped by concerns about race and class—is also beset with omissions. Reviewing several
criminal procedure casebooks, Judge Stephanos Bibas has explained how there
are “few materials on race, politics, or drugs, beyond the occasional doctrinal
31. See Nancy S. Erickson, Final Report: “Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law”, 42 RUTGERS L. REV.
309, 313 (1990); Nancy S. Erickson & Mary A. Lamanna, Sex-Bias Topics in the Criminal Law Course: A Survey
of Criminal Law Professors, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 189, 193 (1990); Mary Irene Coombs, Crime in the
Stacks, or a Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117, 118
(1988).
32. Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Socratic Method in the Age of Trauma, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2320, 2334–37
(2017).
33. Id.
34. Franklin E. Zimring, Is There a Remedy for the Irrelevance of Academic Criminal Law?, 64 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 5, 5 (2014).
35. Id.
36. See Ristroph, Curriculum, supra note 6; see also Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note 6.
37. Ristroph, Curriculum, supra note 6, at 1664–67.
38. Id. at 1685–90.
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subsection.”39 For Judge Bibas, omissions of race, politics, and drugs are crucial because they influence how legislators define what is a crime, how law
enforcement policies regulate criminal behavior, and how prosecutors enforce
criminal laws.40 The “sophisticated interplay of politics, race, and doctrine,”
he argues, “teaches students far more about the real world than a simple presentation of the selective-prosecution doctrine would.”41 Ronald Wright and
Kay Levine likely agree. They have argued that the criminal law curriculum
“tends to have fairly anemic offerings about the criminal justice system
itself.”42 Professors Wright and Levine also rightfully point out that many law
schools fail to offer courses that “expose students to structural concerns that
plague justice systems around the world or invite students to take a hard look
at empirical data about crime rates, incarceration rates, and the intersections of
race, poverty, and crime.”43 The inattention to questions about race, poverty,
and politics is particularly striking since these are issues that criminal justice
scholars have identified as being at the center of our penal status quo.44
Ultimately, empirical, theoretical, and descriptive takes on legal education
lead one to the reasonable inference that law schools are important sites for the
consideration of criminal justice inequality.
II. LAW SCHOOL SOCIALIZATION
Whereas the reproduction thesis is premised on the idea that law schools reflect
and replicate some of the larger problems in American society, law school socialization focuses on the ways legal education promotes certain kinds of attitudinal
dispositions toward the law.45 As a threshold matter, socialization is often examined through the lens of “public interest drift,” which posits that law students begin
their legal education with public interest commitments but are socialized into valuing the economic incentives that come with working in the higher-paying private
39. Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 805
(2003) (book review).
40. Id. at 806.
41. Id. at 810.
42. Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065,
1125 (2014).
43. Id.; see also Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, Grounding Criminal Procedure, 20 J. GENDER,
RACE & JUST. 53, 55 (2017) (examining leading criminal procedure casebooks and finding that “discussions of
race or racism [were] overwhelmingly absent from the cases”).
44. See generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR
SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018) (discussing how the misdemeanor
system perpetuates error, injustice, and inequality); PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN AMERICA (2017) (examining the criminalization of poverty); PAUL BUTLER,
CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2018) (addressing the criminalization of Black men when white men
commit the majority of violent crime in the United States).
45. See generally Gregory J. Rathjen, The Impact of Legal Education on the Beliefs, Attitudes and Values of
Law Students, 44 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1976) (discussing the impact of legal education on selected beliefs, attitudes,
and values of law students).

422

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:413

sector.46 As it relates to this Essay’s discussion on the reproduction of criminal justice inequality, public interest drift is important to the extent that it is likely siphoning students away from indigent defense and prosecutorial work. But scholars have
applied pressure to the idea of public interest drift. 47 Perhaps more crucially, the
thesis tells us less about what happens to the students who enter the criminal justice
bar.
More relevantly, law schools reproduce the penal status quo by socializing students into understanding law primarily as a science that is superordinate to social,
political, and economic concerns—particularly as it relates to marginalized
groups.48 Such extra-legal concerns about marginalized groups are not absent from
legal education in toto; law schools typically supply some combination of clinical
offerings, elective courses, programming, and affinity groups for students interested in getting a deeper understanding of legal inequality. These are all powerful
and necessary learning opportunities. But they are also educational adjuncts that
are subject to self-selection and are in competition with other demands on time,
and of course, availability. Further, these educational supplements are not part of
the core first-year classes—unlike criminal law, which is typically offered in the
first year, and is a site where one might argue that inequality is the appropriate
course of study. Although these educational adjuncts are akin to evidence and
criminal procedure in that they are often not required, they are also not bar courses
that students often feel pressure to enroll in.49

46. See id. at 92 (arguing that legal education socializes students toward an entrepreneurial model as opposed
to a social welfare model); Susan Ann Kay, Socializing the Future Elite: The Nonimpact of a Law School, 59
SOC. SCI. Q. 347, 347 (1978) (same).
47. See John Bliss, From Idealists to Hired Guns? An Empirical Analysis of “Public Interest Drift” in Law
School, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1973, 2015–16 (2018) (arguing that students retain their political commitments
even if they decide to go to a higher-paying job); Monroe H. Freedman, The Loss of Idealism—By Whom? And
When?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 658, 658 (1978) (rejecting the public interest drift thesis); Howard S. Erlanger &
Douglas A. Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional School: The Law School Experience and Student
Orientations to Public Interest Concerns, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 21 (1978) (finding that changes in public
interest attitudes are smaller than reported).
48. The idea of law as a science is hardly new and is a byproduct of the pedagogical design of law school,
particularly the first year, but also for doctrinal courses. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
49. See James E. Moliterno, The Future of Legal Education Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 423, 433–34 (2013)
(“Students, depending on their level of insecurity, feel a need to fill up their schedules with as many bar courses
as possible. Law schools feel a corresponding obligation to offer as many bar courses as possible.”); Andrea A.
Curcio, Society of American Law Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam: July 2002, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 446, 449
(2002) (“From the moment they enter law school through graduation, students realize that unless they pass the
bar examination, their substantial financial commitment and their years of hard work will be wasted. As a result,
many students concentrate on learning primarily what they need to know in order to pass the bar exam, which
often translates into high student attendance in courses that address the substantive law tested on the bar
examination and reduced participation in . . . courses such as environmental law, poverty law, civil rights
litigation, law and economics, and race and the law. As a result, the students fail to fully engage in a law school
experience that will give them both the practical skills and the jurisprudential perspective that will make them
better lawyers”).
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Looking inside the core courses, law school socialization often encourages students to think in ways that are unemotional and detached from pressing social
problems.50 Elizabeth Mertz has detailed this dynamic in her innovative empirical
study of eight law schools that examined the frequency and duration of classroom
speech.51 Professor Mertz found that legal education provides students with a distinctive legal worldview but that it also precludes important social and political
discussions that ultimately disserve the public.52 Students learn how to “think like
a lawyer,” which is generally understood as gaining an analytic ability that legal
professionals uniquely possess (e.g., understanding doctrine, proof, reasonableness, intent, etc.).53 But “thinking like a lawyer” is often not understood as a cultural form of thinking that can rest on unproven assumptions, has its own biases,
and in some instances, disregards other forms of reasoning and information that
might help resolve legal problems.54
The “detached mastery” of legal education aggressively focuses on logical and
analytical reasoning while denying the more dynamic and interpersonal dimensions of criminal justice matters.55 This detachment communicates several messages that are relevant to this Essay’s inquiry: primarily, that interdisciplinarity,
along with legal understandings of racism, sexism, and poverty “can be developed
on their own, easily picked up in practice, or are simply not as demanding or significant in the development of foundational expertise for lawyers.”56 Learning to
think like a lawyer in these ways can lead students to be unaware of the legally specific ways various “-isms” crop up in different areas of criminal justice administration. To the extent that students have their own understandings of social justice,
this form of thinking like a lawyer can lead them to overdetermine how race, poverty, and sexism operate in our system of punishment. In the same ways, students
may miss these issues or over-assign value to inequality in places where it is not
merited precisely because their ideas may not have been battle-tested by professors
and student colleagues.
Law schools also socialize their students into understanding their learning experiences through a host of tiered binaries: law versus policy, substance versus process, and theory versus skills. These categories can be conceptually appropriate
50. RIAZ TEJANI, LAW MART: JUSTICE, ACCESS, AND FOR-PROFIT LAW SCHOOLS 209–10 (2017) (“Law school
teaching in the United States has long separated justice and morality . . . . Though work prosecuting and
defending criminal suspects, or litigating against negligent corporations, undeniably implicates questions of right
and wrong or good and bad, the pedagogy producing these vocations submerges those binaries beneath rules and
processes.”).
51. See MERTZ, supra note 5, at 34 (describing methodology).
52. Id. at 205–06.
53. Id. at 88–89, 98.
54. Id. at 221.
55. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of
Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515, 531 (2007).
56. Id.; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34 IND. L.
REV. 23, 33 (2000) (observing how race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation are often “tacked on as
curricular afterthoughts—as brief digressions from the ‘real’ subject”).
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and pedagogically convenient, but they have consequences for the professional development of future prosecutors and defense attorneys. First, in legal education,
the “policy implications” of law are commonly ignored or understood as marginal.57 Contrary to basic principles of bureaucracy theory, law students are
socialized into understanding indigent defense and prosecution simply as the
practice of law and not as significant sites of criminal justice policymaking.58
Indeed, this is why progressive prosecution and indigent defense reform—
which focus precisely on these issues—are attractive to current law students.
Yet it is not clear that these conversations have permeated the walls of core
criminal justice classes. Socializing students into understanding the legal system through a law/policy lens minimizes the roles prosecutors increasingly
play in criminal justice governance and obscures how indigent defense organizations oftentimes resort to the electoral realm precisely because of a conservative jurisprudential landscape that has shaped their client communities.59
Legal education also insists on a substance/process binary that further partitions
how students understand the criminal justice system. The division between criminal law and criminal procedure best illustrates the substance/process distinction.
This division is rooted in legitimate differences between the two fields in terms of
objectives, the sources of law from which they emanate, and the sheer amount of
content in both fields. But these differences need not be determinative. In fact,
they are arguably impractical.60 Still, this division shapes the legal education
of future public defenders and prosecutors. To the extent that questions of race
and poverty emerge in the criminal justice curriculum, they are understood as
procedural matters—byproducts of the Warren Court’s due process revolution

57. See YOUNG, supra note 20, at 235 (noting that sometimes law professors discuss history and policy
implications, but that “nine times out of ten” those insights won’t be helpful on the grade-determining final exam,
and advising students preparing for finals that “[u]nless a stack of sample answers tells a different story, assume
that come grading time, your policy-analyzing, theory-discussing, poetic-waxing professor will turn into a lean,
mean, lawyerly grading machine”).
58. See Ristroph, Curriculum, supra note 6, at 1701 (arguing that the distinction “gravely distorts our
understanding of criminal law”); Ristroph, Intellectual History, supra note 6, at 1978 (“At most American law
schools, substantive criminal law is a required first-year course, and judging by the casebooks in use, students are
still taught that the substance of criminal law resides in judicial opinions and statutes, not the decisions of
enforcement officials such as police and prosecutors.”).
59. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 116 (2007); Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation
of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 444–48 (2009).
60. These distinctions do not match up neatly with criminal practice, which certainly emphasizes one more
than the other, but requires an integrated understanding of both. Moreover, to the extent that producing “barready” or “practice-ready” attorneys is a law school’s objective, the bifurcation of criminal law and procedure
(and sometimes trifurcation, with criminal procedure being split into courses on investigation and adjudication)
raises efficiency questions since the bar exam crams all these fields into one section of twenty-five questions—
the same as evidence, civil procedure, torts, and other core courses. See Preparing for the MBE, NAT’L CONF.
BAR EXAM’RS, https://www.ncbex.org/exams/mbe/preparing/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). My purpose is not to
advocate for the consolidation of these fields, but to denaturalize these distinctions and begin to gesture toward
what they mean for students.
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and its legacy.61 Some of these issues include police contact with citizens, the
right to counsel, prosecutorial discretion, and sentencing. But it is important to
pause and reiterate here that robust conversations about race and poverty, as
observed by criminal procedure scholars and noted in Part I, supra, are sparse in
corresponding casebooks. Assuming the criminal justice curriculum attends to race
and poverty, criminal procedure is the main event. This focus underappreciates how
substantive criminal law—what and how we punish—is not just influenced by
abstract theories of punishment, but by a long and empirically-demonstrated history
of racial subjugation and poverty management.62 Ultimately, criminal legal education socializes students into having uneven or incomplete understandings of the
ways race and poverty animate the criminal justice system. To the extent that more
sophisticated understandings are sought, they must come autodidactically, through
elective education, or through public defender and prosecutor offices that may
engage in relevant training.
The theory/skills binary varies by school but can have the effect of socializing
students into privileging one over the other at the expense of a more integrated
legal education.63 Most crudely, elite law schools often emphasize theory in core
courses.64 But this focus on theory is relatively light and concerned with black letter law and legal doctrine, leaving less space for meaningful conversations about
law’s relationship to power, bias, poverty, and other inputs that determine criminal
justice outcomes.65 Tragically, by the end of their legal education, students are not
61. See Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools of the
Sixties, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2231, 2232–33 (1993).
62. See, e.g., JULILLY KOHLER-HAUSMANN, GETTING TOUGH: WELFARE AND IMPRISONMENT IN 1970S
AMERICA 20–21 (2019); ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE
POOR 156 (2016); TALITHA L. LEFLOURIA, CHAINED IN SILENCE: BLACK WOMEN AND CONVICT LABOR IN THE
NEW SOUTH 55 (2015); CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED
OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 10 (2014); see generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON,
SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD
WAR II (2012) (discussing the mistreatment of Black Americans and historical legacy of racism); JONATHAN
SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 (1993)
(connecting punishment to political and economic transformations in society); David Arnold, Will Dobbie &
Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q. J. ECON. 1885 (2018) (showing how bail judges are
racially biased against Black defendants); Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated Is the U.S.
Labor Market? The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution, 104 AM. J. SOCIO. 1030 (1999) (exploring the
connection between incarceration and the labor market).
63. See Lucille A. Jewel, Oil and Water: How Legal Education’s Doctrine and Skills Divide Reproduces
Toxic Hierarchies, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 111 (2015) (arguing that the theory/skills dichotomy “is
responsible for reinforcing class, gender, and race segmentation in legal education, which limits the quality of
instruction that law schools can provide and abets the reproduction of existing power relations in the legal
profession and society at large”).
64. In different criticisms that are levied on elite law schools, Judges Harry Edwards and Richard Posner have
both argued that legal education and scholarship are hopelessly detached from the problems of the legal
profession. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY (2016)
(discussing the widening gap within the legal profession); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (same).
65. See Gerald P. López, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated:
Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 326 (1989).
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fully equipped to “describe and critique the political and economic theories underlying various legal arrangements.”66 Riaz Tejani’s study of for-profit legal education describes what happens on the other end of the elitism spectrum. Professor
Tejani shows how economic pressures can lead some law schools to focus on skills
development.67 This focus on skills is premised on producing “practice-ready”
attorneys, but often eclipses knowledge acquisition and the public policy deliberation.68 At law schools across the spectrum, the theory/skills divide is prominent.69
The criminal justice curriculum’s theoretical focus on litigation does not comport
with the practical reality that ninety-five percent of criminal cases are resolved
before trial, and fails to provide students with the skills necessary to be better
problem-solvers and negotiators.70
Law school socialization produces future public defenders and prosecutors who
are poised to understand the core areas of criminal justice curriculum mechanistically and in ways that do not approximate the practical world. It is no wonder why
one prosecutor complained, “Practically speaking, my law degree . . . was worth
about as much as ballet lessons . . . when I started out.”71 It also makes sense
that graduating law students sometimes “feel like they are left holding a Costcosized-receipt-cum-diploma for a mediocre learning experience.”72
The technical focus in criminal legal education is not inherently bankrupt. The
criminal justice curriculum is replete with rules, tests, exceptions, defenses, and
doctrinal landmarks that students need to know to have a basic understanding of
this area of law. But socializing students to understand criminal justice issues
within narrow legal frameworks comes with costs that are borne when they
become practitioners in the criminal justice system. To be sure, there is a dearth of
direct empirical information on how decontextualized legal education shapes race,
class, and gender outcomes in our criminal justice system. But the weight of scholarly complaints about identity-oblivious legal education, along with the reality of
our savagely unequal criminal justice system, lead to the reasonable inference that
law schools are worthwhile sites for reform.
66. Id.
67. TEJANI, supra note 50, at 67.
68. Id.
69. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Changing the Modal Law School: Rethinking U.S. Legal Education in (Most)
Schools, 116 PA. ST. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2012) (categorizing law schools into three groups: elite, modal (the
“most frequently occurring”), and precarious, and noting the need for reform in understanding how “the
theoretical underpinnings of law” translate into practice).
70. Wright & Levine, supra note 42, at 1124–25 (“Most of the current curriculum touching on criminal topics
asks the students to picture themselves in litigation contexts such as trials, hearings on pretrial motions, and
sentencing hearings. Competitions and simulation exercises usually arise in litigation contexts. But litigation
skills courses and competitions do not adequately prepare a student for real practice in U.S. criminal courts . . . .
A more relevant legal education would include workshops on negotiating strategies or judgment exercises, along
with clinical experiences that allow students to observe and participate in the resolution of real cases.”).
71. Id. at 1125 (citation omitted).
72. SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy: Classroom Justice in the Law School Setting, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 467,
467 (2012).
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CONCLUSION
Legal education is an underexplored site for criminal justice reform. The few
empirical studies on race and gender in prosecutorial offices indicate that both categories matter,73 yet these issues, along with poverty, amongst other categories,
occupy undersized space in criminalization. It is no secret that diversity in the legal
profession is an issue, but there is a related and arguably deeper issue of how future
criminal justice practitioners—irrespective of their race and gender—are socialized into understanding the relevance of those categories to their lawyering. The
legal system tasks a relatively unrepresentative set of attorneys with prosecuting
and representing criminal defendants in a world where race, gender, and poverty
influence assumptions about crime as well its regulation. In the courses that are
central to their legal education, they are socialized to believe that these categories
are either irrelevant or additive in ways that may actually be the case in some
instances, and not in others.74
Calls for reform in legal education and the criminal justice system are not new.
But there is a somewhat unique confluence of factors that make this third decade of
the twenty-first century an opportune time to reimagine a system of legal education
that shapes American punishment. There is an increasingly multi-generational,
cross-ideological, and interracial recognition that the American criminal justice
system is unjust. Law school leaders are making unprecedented statements about a
racially biased, poverty-exacerbating criminal justice system. This is all occurring
at a time when a global pandemic is making already squalid correctional facilities
more dangerous.
Law professors are not the most obvious players in criminal justice reform, but
they shape the educational landscape and policies of law schools.75 Law professors
73. See Amy Farrell, Geoff Ward & Danielle Rousseau, Race Effects of Representation Among Federal Court
Workers: Does Black Workforce Representation Reduce Sentencing Disparities?, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 121, 131 (2009) (finding more equitable racial outcomes in districts with more Black prosecutors);
Ryan D. King, Kecia R. Johnson & Kelly McGeever, Demography of the Legal Profession and Racial
Disparities in Sentencing, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 25–26 (2010) (finding that racial disparities in sentencing
attenuate as the number of Black and Latinx attorneys in a county increases); Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and
Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531, 534–37 (1997) (highlighting through an ethnographic study how prosecutors reproduce
race, class, and gender ideologies in their decision-making); see generally Stephanie Holmes Didwania, GenderBased Favoritism Among Criminal Prosecutors (Nov. 9, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(finding that defendants are charged more leniently when they are the same gender as their prosecutor).
74. See Ristroph, Curriculum, supra note 6, at 1682 (“Discussions of discretion, mass incarceration, and racial
disparities appear too much like accessories added as afterthoughts—which, for the most part, they have been.
That allows the unattractive aspects of contemporary criminal law to be seen as bugs, not features, or as newly
developed pathologies that may yet be excised with a still-better model penal code or the right constitutional
decision from the Supreme Court.” (footnote omitted)).
75. ABA Standard 201(a) states, “The dean and the faculty shall have the primary responsibility and authority
for planning, implementing, and administering the program of legal education of the law school, including
curriculum, methods of instruction and evaluation, admissions policies and procedures, and academic standards.”
See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2020–2021, at 11
(2020).
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have the potential to shape the future entrants of the legal profession. Despite a
new COVID-19-inspired educational landscape, some will continue business as
usual and train future penal bureaucrats who reproduce the status quo. Others may
make meaningful changes to how they teach in the criminal justice curriculum and
map core legal lessons to the practical realities that have come under public scrutiny. These changes may slowly alter prosecution and defense norms and coincide
with reform efforts occurring in legal practice. Pedagogical changes and educational choices are not foolproof. Nevertheless, professors who teach in the criminal
justice curriculum cannot plead collective innocence when it comes to the status
quo that people are increasingly rejecting.

